An overview of recent changes to corporate governance frameworks as it pertains to executive remuneration by Koornhof, Pieter G.J.
1 
 
An Overview of Recent Changes to Corporate Governance 
Frameworks as it Pertains to Executive Remuneration

 
Pieter GJ Koornhof
**
 
University of the Western Cape 
 
This article seeks to study at the recent changes in regulation, both of a legislative 
and self-regulatory nature, in the field of corporate governance as it pertains to 
executive remuneration. The main point of departure of the article will be recent 
societal unrest in light of the growing income gap and the advent of the recent global 
economic recession. Firstly, a theoretical underpinning for the remuneration of 
directors is provided, addressing philosophical and economic reasons in this regard. 
Secondly, different methods of executive remuneration are briefly set out and 
evaluated. Finally, a comparative analysis of the changes over recent years in several 
countries, namely the United States of America (US), the United Kingdom (UK), 
Australia and South Africa (RSA), are undertaken, in order to see how the approach 
has shifted with regard to evaluating executive remuneratiom. All of the countries 
mentioned have adapted their regulatory practices, some to a relatively negligible 
extent, whereas others (such as the US, whose structure could be seen to have been 
lacking initially) have been completely overhauled. In concluding, the article 
highlights and comments on the most current debates related to the regulation of 
executive remuneration.   
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of globalisation, the digital age and knowledge economy, there has 
never before been a time in the history of mankind when ordinary people have had 
access to as much information as they have currently. The right of access to 
information has become a legal norm which is widely accepted as fundamental in 
most of civilised society. This right, along with the principle of freedom of the press, 
has led to a revolution in the media, both mainstream and informal. Subsequently, it 
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has become increasingly difficult for individuals and corporations, especially those of 
a highly public nature, to act in any manner without some form of public scrutiny. 
 
One of the pre-eminent issues that arise as a result of the above-mentioned status quo, 
from a corporate governance perspective, is that converning executive remuneration.
1
 
In the light of past global corporate scandals such as that of ENRON, Parmalat and 
Worldcom, as well as the massive divergence that traditionally occurs between 
compensation for executives and workers in the lower rungs of the corporate ladder, 
especially in developing countries, it is relatively easy to comprehend why the public 
at large, including shareholders, is searching for more bang for their proverbial buck. 
From both an economic and moral perspective, questions are being asked as to what 
the reasons and the effects are of such remuneration policies. This question has now 
yet again become relevant due in part to the recent global recession, owing to 
perceptions that it was partly brought about by corporate greed, and the tensions in 
this regard have been exacerbated by global backlashes such as the “Occupy” 
movement.
2
 Most recently, Switzerland has even agreed to a public referendum on the 
capping of executive pay.
3
 
 
This paper seeks to dicuss and analyse some of the issues concerning executive 
remuneration. It will firstly examine the theories and perspectives thereof in order to 
establish a base for the inquiry where after it will give a brief outline of the most 
common forms of compensation for purposes of its analysis of executive 
remineration. Lastly, it will give a brief overview of corporate governance trends in 
the US and UK, with a focus on how regulations have changed. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Also known, inter alia, as director’s remuneration, director’s compensation and executive 
compensation. Unless otherwise stated, these terms will be regarded as having the same meaning. 
2
 The movement, which started off with the “Occupy Wall Street” protests in September of 2011, has 
since moved to several other countries. The movement’s manifesto may be found at 
http://www.occupyagenda.org/, and a general overview of its reach and impact can be found online on 
several news sites such as http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/occupy-movement and 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/o/occupy_wall_street/index.html 
(last accessed on 23 February 2012). 
3
 AFP “Swiss support rises for reduced executive pay” published in The Local on 24 October 2013 
(available at http://www.thelocal.ch/20131024/swiss-backing-rises-for-reduced-exec-pay – Last 
accessed 2 November 2013). 
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2.  THEORIES, PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES IN EXECUTIVE 
REMUNERATION 
The standard position in English Law is that a director has no automatic right to 
remuneration by virtue of the fact that he or she is the director of a company.
4
 This 
principle has also been accepted in South Africa.
5
 However, it is common cause that 
the directors of most profit-driven companies are not only paid but also generally very 
well-paid at that. Accordingly, it is important to analyse why this is the case. 
 
The theoretical approach to corporations and that of executive remuneration has a 
strong economic base. Bruce, Buck and Main
6
 identify three major economic theories 
which are relevant, namely the principal-agent theory, the stakeholder theory and the 
institutional theory. The principal-agent theory relies on the assumption that 
ownership and control in a firm is vested in two distinct bodies (i.e. a company is 
owned by its shareholders, but control is given to the directors by the shareholders), 
and that this is maintained by virtue of “arms-length contracting.”7 It further proposes 
that both the agent (the directors, in our case) and the principal (the shareholders) are 
motivated through rational self-interest. However, the rational self-interest governing 
these two players, and, subsequently, their incentives, can sometimes be divergent: 
the agent wants to ensure he ‘looks good’ and therefore, doesn’t take too many risks, 
whereas the principal wants the highest potential profit which sometimes involves 
taking risks which might yield high returns.
8
  
 
However, it is submitted that the converse of this situation may also at times occur, 
where a director, whose remuneration is linked to a particular aspect of company 
performance may be given a perverse incentive to take risks which yield high 
personal return in the short-run, but which may have catastrophic effects in the long 
run. The latter situation, arguable, is quite similar to what has recently occurred in the 
banking sector, especially when one takes into account the controversy related to the 
bonus payments of senior employees at the American International Group in March 
                                                 
4
 In Re Beeton & Co Ltd [1913] 2 Ch 279. 
5
 Cassim et al, Contemporary Company Law (2
nd
 Edition), Juta (2012) at 454.   
6
 Bruce, Buck and Main Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe, Journal of Management   
Studies Volume 42 Number 7 (November 2005) at 1494.  
7
 Bruce, Buck and Main (2005) at 1494. 
8
 Bahar Executive Compensation: Is Disclosure Enough?, Université de Genève Working Paper 
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2009.
9
 In order to diminish the effect of these occurrences, the principal-agent theory 
proposes that shareholders have to “craft executive pay arrangements that cause a top 
management team motivated by self-interest to maximise shareholder value.”10 
Therefore, executives will be remunerated on such a basis that is high enough for 
them to take risks for the greater good of the company, at the expense of potentially 
looking bad.  
 
A sympathetic view of the role of the directors of a company is given by proponents 
of the stakeholder theory; in this theory, it is assumed that directors do not have such 
a high level of self-interest, but that they will make decisions for the company based 
on the consideration of all stakeholders thereof.
11
 In other words, directors will first 
consult with relevant groups of the ‘company community at large’ (i.e. the 
shareholders, workers, labour unions, etc.) before making a decision, in the hope that 
it will be for the greater good of all involved. Critics of this model argue that directors 
still act in a self-serving manner, albeit only on a long-term rather than a short-term 
basis.
12
 Proponents of the stakeholder theory point out that it is able to explain why 
certain directors actively, and voluntarily, involve themselves in processes of 
corporate governance reform, and that there is also a far lesser emphasis on large pay 
packages.
13
 While the former statement can be corroborated through the willing 
cooperation of companies in the formation of self-regulatory codes (such as the 
Combined Code in the UK and the King Reports in RSA), it is uncertain whether the 
latter statement is nothing more than academic idealism, as the fact that directors 
make decisions based on the greater good of the company and community does not 
necessarily exclude the fact that they might still be expecting to be rewarded for it, as 
it is submitted that they are, at the end of the day, also part of the community of 
stakeholders of a company.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 Mintz, Off with their heads: Samples of AIG Outrage, Bloomberg BusinessWeek (17 March 2009), 
retrievable online at 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2009/db20090317_032819.htm (last 
accessed on 23 February 2011). 
10
 Bruce, Buck and Main (2005) at 1494. 
11
 Bruce, Buck and Main (2005) at 1495. 
12
 Bruce, Buck and Main (2005) at 1496. 
13
 Supra.  
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In contrast with the above-mentioned approaches, the institutional theory does not 
present itself as an alternate model per se, but rather serves to complement and amend 
the other models. It proposes the view that certain institutions, both external and 
relating to a company internally, as well as other related fields and sectors within a 
given context, may have inherent applicability when it comes to influencing 
perspectives surrounding executive remuneration.
14
 Put in context, the economist 
Scott points out that executive remuneration “must be socially legitimate in relation to 
the prevailing regulatory, normative and cognitive influences on firms and these 
societal functions must be reconciled with organizational efficiency.”15 Therefore, 
when determining remuneration, one must take into account the social, functional and 
political pressures that may affect a firm in a direct or indirect manner.
16
 It is 
submitted that this, in light of some of the events already mentioned above, is 
seemingly now more pertinent than ever before. 
 
The above economic theories do not explicitly propound a notion as to how much 
executives should be paid, but rather provide a potential means of determination, and 
one can also identify certain philosophical reasons as to why executives are 
recompensed in the manner that they sometimes are. Shields, O’ Donnell and O’Brien 
point out several of the considerations that can be used to justify current trends in 
executive remuneration. Firstly, it must be noted that the job of an executive is 
dynamic, in terms of content and complexity, and that there has been a constant 
increase in terms of the risk and responsibility of these positions over the past few 
years. It is also pointed out that the tenure for executives has also dramatically 
shortened, with the average ‘lifespan’ of a CEO being between three and five years.17 
A further justification is the seeming scarcity of executive talent,
18
 and the opinion 
that one is only able to attract and maintain managerial ability through ‘premium 
compensation.’ This problem is also worsened by the competition created through the 
globalisation of the labour market, where executives can easily migrate if they believe 
there is potential for better remuneration elsewhere. It is however submitted that the 
                                                 
14
 Bruce, Buck and Main (2005) at 1496. 
15
 As quoted in the article of Bruce, Buck and Main (2005) at 1497. 
16
 Bruce, Buck and Main (2005) at 1497. 
17
 Shields, O’ Donnell and O’Brien The Buck stops here: Private Sector Executive Remuneration in 
Australia, Labour Council of New South Wales (2003) at 12. 
18
 Supra . 
SPECULUM JURIS 2013(1) 
true ‘mobility’ of executives may be overestimated,19 as countries may still impose 
legislation and regulations frustrating labour competition, such as policies relating to 
the acquisition of work permits and incentives for companies to hire local talent. Over 
and above this, the emotional and social impact of movement across borders may also 
play a significant role.  
 
There are, naturally, also contrasting opinions as to the philosophical justification for 
executive remuneration. It is quickly pointed out that one should be wary of 
distributive injustice when it comes to determining compensation.
20
 This is especially 
relevant in developing nations such as South Africa, and in those cases where one 
sees downsizing or downgrading in a firm, be it due to an economic slump or other 
reasons, but where there are still consistent rises in executive pay. It is contended that 
not only does overly high executive pay potentially lead to perverse incentives to 
undermine good corporate governance,
21
 but also to potentially manipulate market 
place perceptions of the company. This relates to the phenomenon of “signal 
jamming,” where companies sometimes use tactics of marketing, false innovation and 
the ‘parking’ of devalued assets into subsidiary companies in order to appear more 
profitable and appealing. Furthermore, executives with overly exorbitant exercised 
share options may harm the share value of a company they should opt for dumping 
their shares in exchange for capital gain.
22
 These forms of conduct and their economic 
side-effects can easily be corroborated by an analysis of recent corporate scandals and 
their aftermath, such as the case of ENRON.  
 
Bahar opines that there are three divergent perspectives when it comes to determining 
executive remuneration, namely moral, economic and intrinsic imperatives.
23
 From a 
moral perspective, in the process one should incorporate principles of fairness when 
determining remuneration packages, as well as attempting to resolve the criticism of 
the media, labour unions, political institutions and the public at large. The author 
however notes that this can be seen as a double standard, as it imposes moral 
                                                 
19
 Shields, O’ Donnell and O’Brien (2003) at 13. 
20
 Shields, O’ Donnell and O’Brien (2003) at 14. 
21
 Shields, O’ Donnell and O’Brien (2003) at 15. 
22
 Shields, O’ Donnell and O’Brien (2003) at 18. 
23
 Bahar (2005) at 2. 
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restrictions on compensation in business, but not for athletes and entertainers.
24
 It is 
respectfully submitted that such a point of view is fallacious, as it does not compare 
apples with apples, and somewhat underplays the impact that business, or rather the 
decisions of businesses, can have on the economy of a country. The economic 
perspective is where one seeks to address the inefficiencies created by, in particular, 
the principal-agent theory - and, to a lesser extent, the inadequacies of the other 
theories - to determine compensation accordingly.
25
 Lastly, the intrinsic perspective 
denotes that one should structure remuneration in such a way that it does not have an 
adverse effect on the intrinsic motivation (such as esteem, prestige and self-
actualisation) which should be experienced by executives. Accordingly, it propounds 
that executive remuneration should be low in order to ensure that executives do not 
become “self-centred profit-seekers.”26 
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that not one of these theories, principles or perspectives 
is absolute or immune to criticism. It would be prudent to take a holistic approach 
when evaluating executive remuneration, as well as how to determine it. Under 
certain circumstances, and in certain countries, some may be more relevant than 
others. Accordingly, one should endeavour to be mindful of and incorporate several of 
the above-mentioned aspects when making a decision as to how to structure an 
executive remuneration scheme.  
 
3. FORMS OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
Now that a base for the enquiry into executive remuneration has been established, it is 
prudent to have an idea of the various forms of compensation that are potentially 
considered. Du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric provide some insight as to what can 
be construed as remuneration.
27
 Over and above this, the second iteration of the King 
Committee Report on Corporate Governance (2002) contained a very broad definition 
of what entails remuneration,
28
 and is also a useful source. Between these two 
sources, one is able to triangulate and compile a list of considerations that include:  
 Salaries 
                                                 
24
 Supra. 
25
 Bahar (2005) at 3-4. 
26
 Bahar (2005) at 4-5. 
27
 Du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance, Cambridge 
University Press (2005) at 231-232. 
28
 Par 2.5.4. 
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 Fees and wages 
 Non-cash benefits 
 Bonuses annually accrued 
 Dividends annually accrued 
 Pension contributions 
 Payments in relation to retirement and termination from office 
 Shares issued and options granted 
 Sign-on payments 
 Restraint payments 
 Generic Cash Benefits  
 
Stapledon
29
 divides these considerations into two general categories, namely 
remuneration which is tied to company performance (generally the most contentious 
issue)
30
 and that which is not. It should be noted that, traditionally, once a director is 
entitled to remuneration, there is no presumption that a company should turn a profit 
in order for it to be paid out,
31
 a position which is accepted as trite in South Africa.
32
 
Performance-based remuneration can also be further divided into short-term and long-
term incentives.
33
 This categorisation is convenient, although not absolute, as one can 
see on closer inspection, and therefore shall be used when discussing and analysing 
these different forms. 
 
3.1 Remuneration tied to Company Performance 
3.1.1 Short-term Incentives 
Short-term incentives would generally include annual salary, fees and/or wages of an 
executive, as well as any bonuses paid out. Annual salaries would not be construed by 
some writers as a short-term incentive, although Stapledon points out that it would 
normally be adjusted in relation to the past performance of a company and an 
executive, and should therefore be regarded as such.
34
 The payment of bonuses to 
                                                 
29
 Stapledon Executive performance-related compensation: the difficulty in truly aligning with 
shareholder returns, 23 Wisconsin International Law Journal 505 (2005) at 506-510. 
30
 Aspects of this have already been explored, and shall be elaborated on further below. 
31
 Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd [1982] 3 All ER (ChD) at 1038. 
32
 Cassim (2012) at 456. 
33
 Stapledon (2005) at 506-510. 
34
 Stapledon (2005) at 507. 
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executives is seen as common cause in most countries, and would generally be 
approximately 50% of the annual salary of an executive.
35
 
 
It would seem that there is a greater emphasis on short-term incentives in companies 
from the UK and Australia. However this is traditionally a relatively small component 
when it comes to the remuneration of American executives.
36
 Whereas these bonuses 
are traditionally calculated on the basis of external performance (i.e. the value of 
shares and the profit of the company), Stapledon notes that there is a movement 
towards using internal performance as a measure. This internal performance measure 
incorporates both quantitative and qualitative aspects, looking at aspects such as 
return on equity, cost management, total operating margins, and value of new 
business, as well as performance relative to competitors and market conditions, 
stakeholder perspectives, personal leadership, effective teamwork at senior 
management levels and strategic positioning.
37
 
 
3.1.2 Long-term Incentives 
Long-term incentives include shares issued, as well as any options granted for shares, 
to executives. It is generally regarded as one of the most complex and contentious 
issues in corporate governance.
38
 According to Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, these 
incentives form nearly half of the average American executive’s actual annual 
income, and have steadily risen over the past few years.
39
 Cheffins and Thomas, using 
different data, speculate that this amount may amount to up to two thirds of US 
executives’ income, almost double that which is awarded to executives in any other 
country.
40
 It is therefore quite easy to see why this issue is controversial. 
 
Traditionally, share options gave executive directors the right to purchase shares at a 
specified period in the future. These shares were acquired with their own money and 
the price thereof was normally set at the market share value of the date of their 
                                                 
35
 Cheffins and Thomas The globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 Berkeley Business 
Law Journal 233 (2004) at 242. 
36
 Supra. 
37
 Stapledon (2005) at 507. 
38
 Cooper The ICSA Handbook of Good Boardroom Practice, ICSA Publishing Ltd, London (2004) at 
105. 
39
 Jensen, Murphy and Wruck Remuneration: Where we’ve been, how we got to here, what are the 
problems, and how to fix them, ECGI Finance Working Paper No 44/2004 (2004) at 31. 
40
 Cheffins and Thomas (2004) at 242-243. 
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employment or the commencement of the option scheme.
41
 According to Stapledon 
this is still the most popular option in Australian companies.
42
 However, since the 
development of the Greenbury Code of 1995, there has slowly but surely been a shift 
in how share option schemes were managed and set up.
43
 These new schemes, 
commonly known as Long-term Incentive Plans (LTIP), have started gaining 
popularity among companies as an alternative to the traditional option.  
 
Because a company is able to devise its own LTIP, there is no governing hard and fast 
rule, although three major variations have seemingly crystallised in practice, namely, 
restricted share schemes, sometimes referred to as Zero Exercise Price Options 
(ZEPO),
44
 matching share schemes, and deferred bonus plans. In the case of 
‘restricted share schemes,’ the right to a set amount of shares vests in a director, at no 
cost, and are released to him or her at the end of a fixed period if he/she is able to 
meet certain performance requirements. Matching share schemes refer to plans where 
executives buy shares at the current market price and hold them for a fixed period, 
thereafter the company will, depending on performance, match the amount of shares 
bought. The last LTIP, namely that of deferred bonus plans, refers to when executives 
are required to use a portion of their annual bonus to purchase shares. These shares 
are then held in trust for a fixed period, thereafter the company will match the amount 
bought.
45
 
 
3.2 Other Forms of Remuneration 
Alternate forms of remuneration, which traditionally would not have even been 
considered as such before the greater emphasis on good corporate governance, include 
benefits such as so-called “signing bonuses,” and allowances on travel, vehicles, rent 
and relocation. Some authors also note that loans made to directors by the company 
should be included, as these loans generally tend to be over long periods and at very 
low interest rate.
46
 Often the most contentious issue in this seemingly grey category 
would be that of payments relating to retirement and termination of service. These 
                                                 
41
 Cooper (2004) at 106. 
42
 Stapledon (2005) at 508. 
43
 Cooper (2004) at 106. 
44
 Stapledon (2005) at 508. 
45
 Cooper (2004) at 108. 
46
 Du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric (2005) at 232. In this regard, it is also relevant to note that the 
South African Companies Act of 2008 includes a definition that states that the difference between the 
market value interest rate of a loan and the interest rate payable by a director to the company is also 
seen to be a form of remuneration.  
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payments, which are commonly known as “golden handshakes,” have created massive 
public outrage in the past, as they directly contradict the notion that executive pay 
should be an incentive for future performance.
47
  
 
4. Corporate Governance Trends in Anglo-American systems 
4.1 The United States of America 
4.1.1 Status quo prior to the recession 
Traditionally, the US has a dual system of corporate governance, incorporating both 
legislation (such as the infamous Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002),
48
 and self-regulatory 
codes in the form of the listing requirements such as the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the NASDAQ Stock Exchange.
49
 Surprisingly, given the massive impact 
it had on most other aspects of American corporate law, Sarbanes-Oxley is silent 
when it comes to executive remuneration, except for two aspects:
50
 Section 304 
allows for ‘claw-backs’ of certain bonuses in instances such as where there is a 
reporting error, and section 402 deals with conflict of interest situations, which also 
places a prohibition on any loans to directors. With the exception of these provisions, 
most principles regarding this issue were to be found in listing requirements. 
 
Prior to the recession, the last amendments to the NYSE listed company manual with 
regard to corporate governance took place in late 2004.
51
 This version of the manual 
stated that all listed companies must have a compensation committee consisting solely 
of independent directors. The committee had to set up a charter to address, among 
other things, the committee’s purpose and responsibilities in terms of the review and 
recommendations of executive remuneration. It was also charged with the task of 
determining and approving the compensation level of the CEO of the company.
52
 
Furthermore, it also required shareholder approval of any form of ‘equity 
compensation plan’ (i.e. share option scheme).53  
                                                 
47
 Hill and Yablon Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: Rediscovering Managerial 
Positional Conflict, 25 University of New South Wales LJ 294 (2002) at 300. 
48
 HR 3763. 
49 
Hill Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, University of Sydney Legal Studies 
Research Paper No 06/35 (2006) at 15. 
50
 Hill Regulating Executive Remuneration: International Developments in the Post-Scandal Era, 3 
European Company Law 64 (2006) at 74. 
51
 NYSE Regulation: Corporate Governance: Historical Reference Material (Available at 
http://www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/1101074752625.html) – Last accessed on 9 May 2011). 
52
 NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 303A.05 (As amended on 3 November 2004). 
53
 NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 303A.08 (As amended on 3 November 2004). 
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Originally the NASDAQ requirements regarding corporate governance could be 
found in Market Place Rule 4350. This section contained similar principles to the 
NYSE, but with two marked differences. Firstly, it did not make the establishment of 
a compensation committee mandatory, but proclaimed that, in the absence of one, a 
majority of independent directors had to determine and approve the compensation 
level for the CEO of the company. Secondly, it also required that the compensation 
committee (or a majority of independent directors) had to determine and approve the 
compensation level of the other executive directors.
54
 
 
From the above, it is clear that the issue of executive compensation was not an 
especially serious concern prior to the recession. In 2007, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) launched an in-depth enquiry into the matter, and proposed the 
adoption of new rules and possible legislation with regard to disclosure concerning 
compensation. These proposed rules would also have broadened the scope and 
definition of what is considered to be executive remuneration.
55
 SEC Commissioner 
Roel Campos, in a speech made on 23 January 2007, stated that special emphasis 
would be placed on disclosure surrounding “the specific circumstances that would 
trigger payments or the provision of other benefits, [and] the estimated payments and 
benefits that would be provided in each covered circumstance.”56 He also called for 
companies to be more wary when establishing remuneration schemes, and to consider 
setting up so-called negotiation teams when doing so. The above notwithstanding, the 
SEC did not issue any further statements in this regard until the events which sparked 
the recent global recession. 
 
4.1.2 Status quo following the recession 
As a result of the financial crisis, US lawmakers introduced a flurry of proposed 
legislation to address the problems brought about by the recession,
57
 and the rules of 
major stock exchanges were also overhauled.  
 
                                                 
54
 NASDAQ Rules, Market Place Rule 4350(c)(3) (Effective until 13 April 2009). 
55
 Hill, 3 European Company Law (2006) at 77. 
56
 “Speech by SEC Commissioner: Remarks Before the 2007 Summit on Executive Compensation” (23 
January 2007) (Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch012307rcc.htm - Last accessed 
on 8 May 2011). 
57
 A substantial amount of bills (most of which never went past the introduction phase) are given when 
doing a rudimentary search on the Library of Congress’ THOMAS Database (http://thomas.loc.gov) 
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The most notable piece of legislation to be passed in the wake of the economic 
meltdown was most assuredly the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
58
 
which was passed in latter part of 2008, and came into effect almost immediately 
thereafter. The Act established new structures, instituted the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program
59
 (commonly referred to as the “bailout package”) and also introduced new 
provisions relating to the taxation of executive remuneration in the financial sector.  
Section 111 of the Act deals with corporate governance and executive remuneration, 
and binds any financial institution that sold troubled assets to the state.
60
 If the assets 
were sold directly to the state, appropriate standards for corporate governance must be 
met. These standards include: 
(A) limits on compensation that exclude incentives for senior executive officers of a 
financial institution to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value 
of the financial institution during the period that the Secretary holds an equity or 
debt position in the financial institution; 
(B) a provision for the recovery by the financial institution of any bonus or incentive 
compensation paid to a senior executive officer based on statements of earnings, 
gains, or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; and 
(C) a prohibition on the financial institution making any golden parachute payment 
to its senior executive officer during the period that the Secretary holds an equity or 
debt position in the financial institution.
61” (my emphasis) 
 
In instances where an institution’s assets were purchased through an auction, and 
where the total value of the purchase exceeds $300 million, any new employment 
contracts with golden parachute clauses are prohibited.
62
 In terms of Section 302 of 
the Act, the Internal Revenue Code was amended to deny tax deductions for 
executives earning in excess of $500,000,
63
 and additional provisions regarding 
parachute payments were also introduced.
64
 Despite these changes, the EESA has not 
always been met with approbation. Cain,
65
 in his analysis of the process of enactment 
of EESA, points out that the Act was unnecessarily rushed, with several aspects not 
well thought through, ultimately leaving the American taxpayer in a precarious 
                                                 
58
 Division A, HR 1424, Hereinafter the EESA. 
59
 Title 1 of Division A, HR 1424, Hereinafter referred to as TARP.  
60
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position at times. In this regard, he points out inadequacies relating to the authorities 
charged with the oversight and implementation of the Act,
66
 and argues for 
amendments which would strengthen the applicability of guidelines accompanying 
EESA,
67
 while also providing for more specific reporting standards for companies 
receiving relief to foster greater accountability and transparency.
68
 
 
Whereas the abovementioned legislation only dealt with the financial sector, other 
changes were also introduced. The NYSE Listed Company Manual underwent several 
amendments during the course of 2009
69
 and 2013,
70
 where the duties and powers of 
the compensation committee have also been expanded. They are now tasked with the 
direct responsibility of “review[ing] and approv[ing] corporate goals and objectives 
relevant to CEO compensation, evaluat[ing] the CEO's performance in light of those 
goals and objectives, and, either as a committee or together with the other 
independent directors (as directed by the board), determin[ing] and approv[ing] the 
CEO's compensation level based on [such an] evaluation.”71 They must also make 
recommendations with regard to the compensation of other executives, as well as 
incentive-compensation and equity-based plans that are subject to board approval.
72
 
Furthermore, shareholders must still approve any and all equity compensation plans, 
as well as any revisions made thereto.
73
 Although the aforementioned principle 
remains unchanged from the previous iterations of the rules, the definitions regarding 
what constitutes equity compensation, as well as the provisions relating to exemptions 
from approval, have been greatly expanded.  
 
NASDAQ Market Place Rule 4350 was repealed in its entirety to make way for more 
comprehensive provisions regarding corporate governance.
74
 The new provisions can 
be found in the Rule 5600 Series, and all companies applying to list or currently listed 
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on the NASDAQ must comply with the qualitative requirements set out therein.
75
 
Rule 5605(d) states that the remuneration of both the CEO and other executives must 
be determined, or recommended to the board for determination, by independent 
directors constituting a majority of a board's independent directors in a vote in which 
only they may participate, or by a compensation committee comprising solely 
independent directors. There are limited instances in which a company may allow 
non-independent directors to vote or form part of the compensation committee, and 
they must also disclose additional information in such cases. Furthermore, shareholder 
approval is also now required “prior to the issuance of securities when a stock option 
or purchase plan is to be established or materially amended or other equity 
compensation arrangement made or materially amended, pursuant to which stock may 
be acquired by officers, directors, employees, or consultants[.]
76”  
 
In addition to the above, according to the preamble, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009
77
 was enacted to “promote the financial 
stability of the US by improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system.” The Act brought about several amendments and additions to the law relating 
to executive remuneration, including shareholder approval for standard remuneration 
and golden parachute schemes,
78
 and measures for ensuring the independence of 
compensation committees.
79
 The SEC requires that relevant companies must disclose 
the remuneration of the CEO in relation to the financial performance of the company 
itself.
80
 Lastly, policies regarding the recovery of any incentive-based remuneration 
which was awarded due to erroneous calculations in financial statements must be 
adopted and implemented.
81
  
 
In March 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed new rules relating 
to listing standards for compensation committees and consultants,
82
 as well as new 
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proposals regarding disclosure of incentive-based compensation arrangements.
83
 It is 
thus clear that the recession has resulted in the US legislature and regulatory bodies 
taking a stronger position regarding issues of corporate governance and executive 
remuneration and has placed it as a priority topic on their current agenda.  
 
4.2 The United Kingdom 
4.2.1 Prior to the recession 
The UK corporate governance scene is traditionally a self-regulatory one, with the 
greatest sources of self-regulation generally being based on the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance,
84
 as well as the UK Listing Authority’s Listing Rules (as used 
by the London Stock Exchange).
85
 The Combined Code was established mainly as a 
result of the recommendations of the 2003 Higgs Report, and incorporates aspects 
derived from several older corporate governance reports, such as the Cadbury, 
Greenbury, and Hampel and Smith reports.
86
 
 
Prior to the recession, the Combined Code’s amendments were last made in 2006, and 
stipulated that a company should under normal circumstances establish a 
remuneration committee consisting of at least three independent directors.
87
 The 
principle underlying this provision is that no director should have the power to 
determine or be involved in determining his own compensation.
88
 This committee 
would be charged with the task of evaluating and determining all forms of executive 
remuneration, including pension rights and any form of compensation.
89
 Suggestions 
as to how certain forms of remuneration should be considered, such as how pension 
and bonuses should be calculated, were set out in Schedule A of the code. The Code 
also propounded that a pay system based on performance was to be preferred in 
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principle.
90
 Furthermore, the code recommended that shareholders should be invited 
to approve any new LTIPs, as well as any major amendments to old schemes.
91
 
 
The Listing Rules complemented the Combined Code’s provisions appropriately by 
placing certain mandatory requirements on companies in terms of disclosure to its 
shareholders. Listing Rule 9.8.8 stated that all listed companies must compile a 
shareholders’ report containing details on the executive remuneration policy, as well 
as details on various aspects of individual directors’ remuneration, such as total 
remuneration, significant payments, pension contributions and LTIPs, to but name a 
few.  
 
From a statutory perspective, there is not a lot of regulation regarding the relevant 
issue. The 2006 Companies Act
92
 states that members of a quoted company must vote 
to approve the directors’ remuneration report for a given financial year.93 Failure to do 
so would constitute an offence.
94
 However, given as this vote related to the report and 
not the remuneration policy as such, it is submitted that it was more of an advisory 
nature. 
 
Thompson notes that the post-Cadbury era face of corporate governance seems to 
have improved and that the abovementioned self-regulatory codes had a positive 
effect. This, he argues, can be seen in the fact that a greater emphasis was placed on 
corporate performance, and that the amounts paid out in severance packages also 
decreased significantly.
95
 
 
4.2.2 Status quo in the UK following the recession 
From a legislative point of view, a few substantial changes have been made, 
especially with relation to listed companies. New regulations regarding the general 
rights and powers of shareholders have been introduced,
96
 as well as much more 
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detailed regulations on the content of remuneration reports,
97
 specifically with regard 
to how individual remuneration packages are set out.
98
 Most notably, the Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform Act 2013
99
 inserts a new section in the 2006 Companies 
Act
100
 which now states that the members of a quoted company must vote to approve 
the director’s remuneration policy at an accounts meeting at least every three years.101 
Provisions are also made for subsequent votes in case a policy is rejected,
102
 and a 
failure to comply is subject to the same penalties as found in Section 440.
103
 
Accordingly, the vote on director’s remuneration is now a binding one rather than 
advisory. 
 
Since the recession there have been three revisions of the Combined Code, one in 
June 2008, another in June 2010, and the most recent in September 2012 (where it 
was also renamed as the ‘UK Corporate Governance Code’). The provisions relating 
to remuneration have remained largely unchanged, even though the 2010 version is 
slightly more nuanced. The 2008 revision states that pay-outs or grants made under all 
incentive schemes, including new grants under existing share option schemes, should 
be subject to challenging performance criteria reflecting the company’s objectives. 
Furthermore, consideration should be given to criteria which reflect the company’s 
performance relative to a group of comparator companies in some key variables such 
as total shareholder return.
104
 In comparison, a similar principle in the 2010 version 
states that criteria should include non-financial performance metrics where 
appropriate, and that remuneration policies should be compatible with risk policies 
and systems.
105
 It is submitted that these nuanced changes were made in order to 
ensure compliance with the 2009 EC recommendations relating to remuneration.
106
 
The 2012 revision uses the exact same wording for the entire section,
107
 as well as 
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Schedule A dealing with the design of performance-related remuneration packages,
108
 
and it is submitted that this position therefore remains largely unchanged in this 
particular regard. The original Combined Code used a “comply or explain” approach, 
which has subsequently been re-affirmed in later versions.
109
 Arcot, Bruno and Faure-
Grimaud,
110
 criticised this approach in the Combined Code, pointing out that the 
wording lends itself more to the “apply or explain” approach, similar to what has been 
adopted in the Netherlands and in RSA, whereby a company must directly comply 
with the recommendations of the Code, or otherwise demonstrate, if it is unable to do 
so, how it intends to incorporate or implement the principles of the Code in another 
way. The authors argue that this would be a more beneficial way of dealing with a 
self-regulating system, after analysing a trend in UK companies to lapse into 
complacence after initial compliance, and fail to provide proper explanation for their 
subsequent inability to comply. Notwithstanding the name given to the approach, it 
very much seems that the 2012 Code follows the principle of “apply or explain.” This 
is evidenced by the single new addition to the 2012 Code’s section relating to the 
principle of “Comply or Explain,” being the following proviso:  
“It should set out the background, provide a clear rationale for the action it is taking, 
and describe any mitigating actions taken to address any additional risk and maintain 
conformity with the relevant principle. Where deviation from a particular 
provision is intended to be limited in time, the explanation should indicate when 
the company expects to conform with the provision.”111 (Own Emphasis) 
 
The financial sector has also received specific attention from the EU, initially in the 
form of Directive 2010/76/EU, which, inter alia, deals with the supervisory review of 
remuneration policies in the financial sector. In terms of the Directive, member states 
must require that financial institutions have “robust governance arrangements” 
including “remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with and promote 
sound and effective risk management.”112 In terms of the Impact Assessment relating 
to the Directive, the amendments were proposed due to findings that financial 
remuneration schemes of institution failed to align employees' incentives with the 
                                                 
108
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long-term objectives of the company
113
 as well as a lack of express requirements to 
supervise risks arising in connection with remuneration policies.
114
 The relevant 
principles have also been adopted as part of the Remuneration Code in the Financial 
Conduct Authority’s Handbook.115 Directive 2010/76/EU has recently been replaced 
by the introduction of Directive 2013/36/EU and its related regulations,
116
 which must 
be effected by member states by 31 December 2013, and which will bring about 
substantial oversight and stringent regulation of remuneration in this sector, including, 
most notably, the capping of bonuses. The Directive has generated significant debate, 
and is both an intricate and extensive source of regulation in and of itself. However, 
an in-depth analysis of this sector-specific instrument falls outside of the scope of this 
more general discussion.   
  
4.3 Australia 
4.3.1 Status quo prior to the recession 
Du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric state that there are traditionally three main sources 
that can be used to determine corporate governance in Australia. These sources 
include legislation, the so-called ‘hybrids’, which include listing rules and best 
practice recommendations, and ‘soft law,’ or voluntary self-regulatory codes.117 Prior 
to the recession, the most notable reforms relevant to executive remuneration occurred 
in terms of legislation promulgated under the Company Law Economic Reform 
Program (CLERP), as well as through the adoption of certain accounting standards. 
The Listing Rules of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) was also amended to 
further strengthen certain principles.
118
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Hill regards the most influential legislation introduction during this period to be that 
of the CLERP 9 Act of 2004.
119
 The CLERP 9 Act imposed pertinent changes on how 
corporate governance was viewed from the government’s perspective, and managed 
to lay down several fundamental provisions regarding, inter alia, executive 
remuneration.
120
 Schedule 5 of CLERP 9 introduced enhanced disclosure 
requirements in terms of informing shareholders, gave them the right to an advisory, 
non-binding vote on remuneration
121
 and also emphasised that there should be a link 
between levels of compensation and company performance.
122
 This entailed the 
incorporation of remuneration reports as part of the directors’ annual report, which 
had to disclose the remuneration policy of the company, as well as the individual 
remuneration for directors and the five highest paid executives. It also tightened up on 
provisions regarding severance payment, thereby giving shareholders the power to 
approve any and all termination packages by means of a vote.
123
 
 
Rule 4.10.3 of the ASX Listing Rules
124
 stipulated that all listed companies must 
either comply with the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations,
125
 or explain why they 
did not do so. Principle 9 set out rules and recommendations surrounding executive 
remuneration. The most notable recommendations are: that companies should disclose 
remuneration policy;
126
 that a remuneration committee charged with evaluating and 
approving aspects of remuneration and mostly consisting of independent directors, 
should be set up for the company:
127
 and that companies must ensure that payment of 
equity-based compensation is made in accordance with shareholder approval.
128
 Rule 
10.14 of the Listing Rules also states that a company may not permit a director, 
associate of a director, or any other person in a similar relationship to acquire shares 
under an employee incentive scheme without the approval of ordinary shareholders. 
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4.3.2 Status quo following the recession 
Since the beginning of the recession, the ASX Corporate Governance Council has 
issued a second edition of their Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, which was amended again in 2010.
129
 Whereas the principles in 
the new edition are similar to those entrenched in the original, the practice 
recommendations have been developed and expanded. Principle 8 states that 
companies should ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient 
and reasonable and that its relationship to performance is clear.
130
 Recommendation 
8.1 stipulates that the board still has the ultimate say regarding remuneration, although 
a committee should make recommendations to the board, while being provided with 
enough information and resources so as to enable them to fully advise the board 
accordingly. Notably, it is recommended that a remuneration policy should be 
designed in such a way that it motivates senior executives to pursue long-term growth 
and success of the company and demonstrate a clear relationship between their 
performance and subsequent remuneration.
131
 Recommendation 8.3 also stipulates 
that companies should clearly distinguish between the remuneration of executive and 
non-executive directors. For executive directors, remuneration packages should 
involve a balance between fixed and incentive pay, reflecting short and long-term 
performance objectives appropriate to the company’s circumstances and goals.132 
Shareholder notification and approval for all aspects of remuneration are also 
recommended. The Principles also follow a “if not, why not?” approach, similar to the 
“comply or explain” approach used by the Combined Code.133 Recently, the 
Corporate Governance Council has proposed that a the Principles be revised and a 
third edition be issued.
134
 
 
During 2011, the Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director 
and Executive Remuneration) Act
135
 was introduced. The Act incorporated 
regulations relating to remuneration consultants and remuneration policy 
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recommendations into existing Australian corporate law. In accordance with these 
new provisions, remuneration consultants must be approved by the board or 
remuneration committee.
136
 Furthermore, consultants must provide their 
recommendations free of undue influence by either the board or remuneration 
committee, and may not disclose their recommendations to any executive director in 
isolation, or any other person who is not a member of the board or remuneration 
committee.
137
 Executive directors are not allowed to put at risk any part of their 
remuneration which has yet to vest in themselves, or which is still subject to certain 
conditions. Furthermore, they are also not allowed to take part in the advisory vote 
regarding remuneration reports.
138
 Notably, the so-called “two-strike” rule is 
introduced through provisions which states if a 25% or more of a company’s members 
vote against the acceptance of the remuneration report at two consecutive annual 
general meetings, the directors must allow for a ‘spill resolution’ where their positions 
may be vacated. If the resolution passes with a simple majority, a special general 
meeting must be held within 90 days and all directors (excluding the managing 
director) will need to stand for re-election.
139
 
 
4.4 South Africa 
4.4.1 Prior to the recession 
Corporate governance was largely regulated by the 2002 King Committee Report on 
Corporate Governance (commonly known as King II). King II was a self-regulatory 
voluntary code which relied on the principle that companies should either comply, or 
explain as to why they are unable or unwilling to do so. It did, however, ensure a 
greater influence on the South African sphere of corporate governance than most 
voluntary codes, owing to the fact that Schedule 22 of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) Listing Requirements decreed that companies must adhere to the 
report’s code of corporate practice and conduct (commonly referred to as the King II 
Code) should they wish to be or remain listed.
140
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The provisions regarding executive remuneration can be found in Paragraph 2.5 of 
King II Code. The general principle, as set out it Paragraph 2.5.1, is that levels of 
remuneration be sufficient in attracting, retaining and motivating executives of a high 
quality calibre on a board of directors. This is further strengthened by the notion in 
Paragraph 2.5.5 that performance-based remuneration should constitute a substantial 
portion of total pay (in a sense, this principle coincided with the Combined Code). It 
recommends that companies should set up a remuneration committee, which consists 
of a majority of independent directors and must be chaired by an independent director. 
This committee should make recommendations regarding the remuneration 
framework of the company, as well as the individual remuneration packages of the 
executive directors. Ultimately, the power to approve still lay in the hands of the 
board, although executive directors are warned against playing any part in decision-
making regarding their own remuneration.
141
  
 
Other notable recommendations included that companies should disclose the members 
of their remuneration committee, and that its chair should be accountable at the 
Annual General Meeting of the company.
142
 Furthermore, it stated that companies 
should provide full disclosure of the remuneration of individual directors.
143
  
 
There are some issues in terms of executive remuneration regulated by virtue of 
legislation, most notably that of “golden handshakes.” Section 227 of the former 
Companies Act
144
 stated that a company may not make any payments, or grant any 
benefits or advantages, to a director or past director in order to compensate him/her 
for his/her loss of office through termination or retirement unless there is a special 
resolution passed by the company. Furthermore, any payments made in compensation 
or consideration for loss of office or otherwise, as relates to share option schemes or 
take-overs, are also considered to be invalid. These payments shall only be seen as 
valid if full particulars are disclosed to the members of the company for their 
approval. Sections 295 to 297 also laid down provisions that a company should 
disclose any security given for and loans made to directors (be it before or after their 
appointment), as well as details regarding its pension schemes for directors, in their 
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financial statements. Over and above this, Tables A
145
 and B
146
 (the standard Articles 
of Association for public and private companies as found in Schedule 1 of the 1973 
Act), also provided for shareholders to approve a remuneration policy framework 
from time to time. 
 
4.4.2 Status quo following the recession 
The South African company law regime has recently undergone a total change of 
character, with the introduction of a completely new Act
147
 and a new version of the 
King Report and Code.
148
 These changes did not necessarily happen as a result of the 
recession, but one would to present a strong case to state that it did not have some 
kind of effect on the development thereof.  
 
The third iteration of the King Report contains three over-arching principles regarding 
executive remuneration, namely that companies should remunerate directors and 
executives fairly and responsibly,
149
 disclose the remuneration of each individual 
director and certain senior executives,
150
 and that shareholders should approve the 
company’s remuneration policy.151 In line with these principles, the Code 
recommends, inter alia, that remuneration policies aligned with the strategy of the 
company and linked to individual performance should be adopted,
152
 which addresses 
aspects relating to: 
 all benefits paid to directors; 
 the salaries of the three most highly-paid employees who are not directors; 
 the policy on base pay; 
 participation in share incentive schemes; 
 the use of benchmarks; 
 incentive schemes to encourage retention; 
 justification for salaries above the median; 
 material payments that are ex gratia in nature; 
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 policies regarding executive employment; and 
 the maximum expected potential dilution as a result of incentive awards.153  
 
The remuneration committee should aid in the setup of such policies,
154
 and 
integrated, detailed remuneration reports relating to them should also be compiled. 
Another significant change to the Code is that former versions adopted a “comply or 
explain” approach, whereby companies who didn’t adhere to recommendations 
simply had to explain why it did not do so. King III, on the other hand, has opted for a 
new “apply or explain” approach.155 
 
The new Companies Act has several provisions relevant to the issue of executive 
remuneration. Section 30(4) states that the annual financial statements of a company 
must contain, inter alia, details regarding the remuneration and benefits of each 
director or person holding a prescribed office in the company. The relevant 
information disclosed must meet particular prescribed minimum standards.
156
 It must 
be noted that the definition given to ‘remuneration’ in terms of the Act is also quite 
broad.
157
 The issuing of shares for incentive schemes for directors must also be 
approved by means of special resolution.
158
 Provisions regarding loans and financial 
assistance to directors can also be found in Section 45. Notably, remuneration may 
only be paid to directors if it is provided for in the Memorandum of Incorporation,
159
 
and only in accordance with a special resolution approved by the shareholders every 
two years.
160
 Cassim notes that these provisions are an attempt to curtail excessive 
remuneration,
161
 although it is submitted this is not necessarily always the effect that 
they will have in practice. Naidoo also opines that while the approval of overall 
remuneration policies are welcome, the board should still have some discretion and 
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responsibility when it comes to the remuneration of specific directors in terms of the 
adopted policy framework.
162
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Executive remuneration, especially from the perspective of good corporate 
governance, is a system that has greatly developed in the last decade or so. As can be 
seen from the above discussion, it is clear that the recent economic shock and 
scandals in the global financial services sector has had an impact on the regulation of 
corporate governance. But these developments clearly also leave much room for 
improvement. Whereas previous scandals led to wide-spread reform with regard to 
aspects of financial oversight and risk management within companies themselves, the 
most recent ones have definitely had a more profound effect on how the public view 
remuneration practices.  
 
In many jurisdictions it would seem that latest regulations and provisions were 
imposed as more of a knee-jerk reaction to recent crises than as a system which 
evolved organically. This particular phenomenon is not something foreign to the field, 
and it is submitted that when it comes to policies and practices of company oversight, 
there is rarely a perfect answer, and problems (and problematic perceptions) are often 
only addressed as and when it becomes a prickly issue, that is, reactively rather than 
proactively. This should not be seen as a failure of systems of corporate governance, 
as there is unfortunately always scope for abuse when discretion is given.  
  
Seemingly, there are two interesting debates which have arisen following the global 
recession; one generally relating to self-regulating codes, and the other specifically 
dealing with the aspect of executive remuneration. With regard to the former, there is 
currently some speculation as to whether the traditional “comply or explain” model 
for self-regulating systems has become somewhat dated. In this regard, countries such 
as South Africa, the Netherlands and Finland have adopted the modified “apply or 
explain” approach,163 whereas other countries such as Australia and the UK have, at 
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least on paper, re-affirmed their dedication to “comply or explain” with both 
providing greater nuance and clarification to their understanding of its intended nature 
and extent. There are some who would argue that the two phrases are interchangeable, 
but it is submitted that the “apply or explain” approach places a greater emphasis on 
self-reflection and the principle of substance over form.  
 
A specific development when it comes to the regulation of executive remuneration is 
the adoption by several countries of so-called “say-on-pay” policies, including all of 
the countries discussed above (although different countries have adopted different 
stances in this regard). “Say-on-pay” relates to some form of shareholder 
involvement, and often outright approval of remuneration schemes, either for 
directors in general or on an individual basis. A distinction should also be drawn 
between countries which have adopted a binding process, and where it is merely 
advisory. The question as to what the goal of “say-on-pay” is, or whether it is in any 
way effective, has been hotly contested. Gordon is quick to point out that “say-on-
pay” has had little to no effect on the steady rise of executive pay in the UK, 164 but 
does note certain positive effects such as increased consultation between companies 
and large shareholders, and that the instances where directors are paid for their 
failures have become less common.
165
 Delman lists several potential problems with 
“say-on-pay,” mainly dealing with shareholders who do not always have the 
necessary insight or resources to enable them to make meaningful decisions relating 
to company policy of such a nature.
166
 It is submitted that, whereas “say-on-pay” does 
have certain systemic failings, and is definitely not the most effective tool to curb 
excessive pay, it does however serve to promote greater transparency with regards 
remuneration practices, which generally tends to lead to greater accountability, 
especially in light of the intense scrutiny that companies are placed under in modern 
times. 
 
The miasma of issues surrounding executive remuneration is not something that can 
be properly addressed in a single paper, and this particular paper is only a preliminary 
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discourse in addressing legislation, regulation and problems posed by executive 
remuneration and related matters.  In concluding, the question as to whether the 
current regulations in place will address the issues at hand is one that is difficult to 
answer. It is also not overly cynical to believe that there will be further tendency of 
scandals or occurrences where executives are exorbitantly paid even where there are 
no expectations of beneficial return for a company or its stakeholders. One can only 
hope that through a decent mixture of self-regulation (where one also inherently needs 
a dash of self-discipline and accountability) and legislation the situation may in the 
future be adequately addressed. 
